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Abstract 
 
The announcement by Presidents Obama and Castro in December 2014 of a major step towards 
normalisation of inter-state relations was part of what is primarily a political process, but 
normalisation implies a return to peaceful inter-state relations based on respect for fundamental 
principles of international law. This commentary explores the role that those principles have played in 
helping shape the confrontation between the United States and Cuba since the revolution of 1959, 
which has been underpinned by an economic, commercial and financial embargo of Cuba by the 
United States. From being an integral part of the bilateral dispute, this commentary argues that at key 
moments international law can shift to form part of a solution. The changing political landscape raises 
the prospects of the parties turning to international law as a means of restoring normal relations 
between the two countries resulting, amongst other changes, in the demise of the embargo.      
 
 
Introduction 
 
The embargo of Cuba,1 formally imposed by President Kennedy in 1962,2 is a central feature of the 
long running breakdown in bilateral relations between Cuba and the United States. Bilateral 
                                           
1 Cubans often refer to it as ‘el bloqueo’ or ‘blockade’ rather than ‘el embargo’ – see André Zadívar Diéguez, 
Bloqueo: el asiedo económico más prolongado de la historia (La Habana: Capitan San Luis, 2003). Under 
classical international law a blockade  is the ‘blocking by men-of-war of the approach to the enemy coast … for 
the purpose of preventing ingress or egress of vessels or aircraft of all nations’ – John P. Grant and J. Craig 
Barker, Parry & Grant Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University 
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relationships are arguably the most important ones in international relations for if one state falls out 
with another then wars or other destabilising ruptures of international peace often result. Multilateral 
agreements and organisations may help to maintain inter-state relations on the basis of mutual respect 
for sovereignty but they cannot guarantee that inter-state relations will not break down.3 Ultimately, 
international law cannot prevent a breakdown in bilateral relations but it can and should play an 
important role in re-establishing normal inter-state relations. Normal inter-state relations are premised 
on mutual respect for the fundamental primary rules of international law, including sovereign 
equality, self-determination, the non-use of force and non-intervention. When relations break down, 
usually with accusations of violations of those rules, the secondary rules of international law are 
available to the parties, and to those actors supporting a peaceful resolution, to end the rupture and 
remediate any wrongs. The dispute between the United States and Cuba provides the severest test for 
international law in that it is a bilateral relationship where the norm has been one of coercive 
confrontation rather than peaceful co-existence. However, this commentary argues that international 
law provides the only sustainable path out of what appears to be an intractable dispute.      
The embargo is at the heart of the dispute between the two countries,4 an on-going anachronism that is 
viewed by one side as a lawful response to illegality or, indeed, as an exercise of its freedoms, and by 
the other side as a violation of its rights and a denial of its freedoms. Inevitably, the embargo serves 
wider political purposes, but both sides use the legalities of it to legitimate their actions and reactions. 
In legal terms, one side sees the embargo as a continuing enforcement of international law combined 
with a right not to trade, while the other side sees it as a prolonged violation of international law and a 
coercive form of intervention. In domestic legal orders, dispute resolution before a court would 
provide answers, but the principal institutional ‘judgment’ on the Cuban embargo is provided by the 
UN General Assembly, which since 1992 has overwhelmingly and repeatedly reiterated the necessity 
of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo by the United States against Cuba by 
                                                                                                                                   
Press, 2009), p.65. While the US measures against Cuba do not amount to a blockade in technical or formal 
sense, the cumulative effect of them is to put an economic stranglehold on the island, which not only prevents 
United States-Cuba intercourse but also effectively blocks commerce with other states, their citizens and 
companies.  Cuba uses the term ‘embargo’ in recent reports to the UN  – see the UN Secretary General’s Report, 
‘Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America 
against Cuba’, UN Doc A/71/91 (2016).  
2 Proclamation 3347, ‘Embargo on All Trade with Cuba’, 3 February 1962, in which the President, acting under 
the Foreign Assistance Act 1961, prohibited ‘the importation into the United States of all goods of Cuban origin 
and all goods imported from or through Cuba’. 
3 Eric W. Cox, Why Enduring Rivalries Do – or Don’t End (Boulder, Col: First Forum Press, 2010); Charles A. 
Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace (Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2010). 
4 Patrick J. Haney and Walt Vanderbush, The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American Foreign 
Policy (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2005); Nigel D. White, The Cuban Embargo under 
International Law: El Bloqueo (London: Routledge 2015). 
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reference to the principles of sovereign equality, non-intervention and non-interference in internal 
affairs, and freedom of international trade and navigation.5  
The agreement towards normalisation between the United States and Cuba, made public in 
simultaneous announcements by Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro on 17 December 2014, 
did not immediately lead to a change in attitude by the General Assembly. In October 2015, the 
General Assembly did not alter the language of its annual resolution, at least sufficiently, to avoid a 
negative vote by the United States, although the Assembly welcomed the resumption of diplomatic 
relations, and the willingness of the US President to work towards lifting the embargo.6 However, in 
October 2016 the annual resolution was adopted by 191 to 0 with 2 abstentions (United States and 
Israel).7 The move from negative vote to abstention by the United States was a further sign of 
movement towards normalisation and the possible ending of the embargo, at least until the election of 
Donald J. Trump to the US Presidency in November 2016,8 and the policy changes announced by him 
on 16 June 2017. This commentary includes an assessment of those changes in terms of their impact 
on the movement towards normalisation. 
Although not a form of dispute settlement, declaratory resolutions of the General Assembly should 
not be seen as irrelevant. In a broad sense the Assembly’s declaratory resolutions have been seminal 
in charting the changing nature of international law since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948. Indeed, the General Assembly’s resolutions on self-determination, aggression, non-
intervention and permanent sovereignty over natural resources have provided a backdrop to the 
United States-Cuba dispute. However, the Assembly’s condemnatory resolutions on the Cuban 
embargo cannot be seen as a form of dispute settlement, though they might add to the weight of legal 
opinion (opinio juris) on the illegality of such embargoes, as well as to the weight of world opinion 
against the US embargo itself. The chances of the United States-Cuba dispute being resolved by the 
International Court of Justice are remote as both parties have to consent to the Court’s jurisdiction,9 
although the UN General Assembly could ask the Court for an advisory opinion on the legality of the 
                                           
5 For example, UN Doc A/RES/69/5 (2014) adopted by 188 votes to 2 (US, Israel) with 3 abstentions (Marshall 
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau).  
6 UN Doc A/RES/70/5 (2015), adopted by 191 votes to 2 (US and Israel).   
7 UN Doc A/RES/71/5 (2016). 
8 On 1 November 2017, the US reverted to casting a negative vote in the General Assembly in UN Doc 
A/RES/72/4, adopted by 191 votes to 2 (US and Israel). 
9 Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945. 
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embargo.10 Judicial settlement is not the norm in seemingly intractable disputes that go deeper than 
issues of title to contested territories or maritime areas.11  
 
International Law as an Integral Part of the Dispute 
International law is not a set of clear and precise rules, which provide black and white answers, as the 
following analysis of the history of the embargo will demonstrate. In the dispute stage international 
law appears to be a tool in the armoury of the protagonists, but even in this stage behind the scenes 
often hidden diplomacy reveals a more nuanced understanding of international law. Under this 
conception, international law has a politically acceptable abstract nature that allows for conflicting 
interpretations, but also invites the possibility of achieving agreement. In this legal context the 
parameters of the dispute between the United States and Cuba will be explored by outlining the legal 
arguments of both sides and the historical and political contexts within which they were made. The 
argument will then be made that it is only when the political context is favourable to settlement of the 
dispute that a common understanding of international law can be achieved. This means that at the 
settlement phase international law changes from being part of the dispute to being a method of ending 
it.  
 
The starting point in understanding the relevance of international law to bilateral disputes is to 
examine the history within which relations between Cuba and the United States have been shaped. 
That history is a struggle about sovereignty, independence, intervention, self-determination and, more 
recently, human rights, illustrating the relevance of fundamental principles of international law, 
although there is disagreement between the parties as to their content, meaning and application. 
Furthermore, international law has developed and changed over the period of the dispute.  
 
Certainly, Cuba’s struggle to achieve external self-determination from Spain during the latter’s long 
and brutal colonial occupation of the island from 1511-1898 was not in pursuance of a right 
recognised by international law at that time. The still-cited judgment in the Island of Palmas 
arbitration of 1928, concerning a dispute between the United States and the Netherlands about what 
had exactly been ceded by Spain to the US in 1898, remains authority for the legality of colonial 
                                           
10 Under Article 65 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945; for example, used by the General 
Assembly to request an advisory opinion on the legality of the construction of a wall by Israel in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories – Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (2004) ICJ Rep, p.136. 
11 Christine Gray, ‘The Use and Abuse of the International Court of Justice in the Enforcement of International 
Law’ in Kalliopi Koufa (ed), International Law Enforcement: New Tendencies (Athens: Sakkoulas, 2010), 
p.195.  
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occupation and cession, although the language of the judgment was one of ‘sovereignty’.12 In effect, 
international law, from the sixteenth century until well into the twentieth century, recognised that 
colonial states could exercise sovereignty over colonised territories and could transfer such territory to 
another ‘civilised’ state, and that sovereignty proved to be hard for colonised peoples to wrestle 
back.13 International law recognised Spain’s title to Cuba by way of discovery, occupation and 
possession, and its right to cede that territory to the United States in 1898.14 
Spain’s defeat by the United States in the war of 1898 resulted in Spain ceding territories to the US in 
the Treaty of Paris,15 which led to an initial period of occupation of Cuba by the United States until 
1902.16 The United States saw this period as a means of facilitating a transition from Spanish rule 
towards formal Cuban independence. Indeed, US troops had fought alongside Cuban rebels to defeat 
the Spanish and so, from the perspective of the United States, this was portrayed as a liberation of 
Cuba and not an occupation at least one with any neo-colonial or imperial intent. From the Cuban 
point of view, however, rather than a brief transition to full independence, this period is viewed as a 
time when victory for the Cuban rebels was taken from them by an intervention and occupation that 
was designed to create a state that was dependent upon the United States both economically and 
politically.17 The United States reserved the right to re-intervene, making its withdrawal conditional 
upon the inclusion of this right in the Cuban constitution in the form of the Platt Amendment of 1901, 
and it used the same method to secure a perpetual lease on the naval base at Guantánamo Bay,18 
actions that clearly undermined Cuban sovereignty.19 In effect, Cuban sovereignty was not absolute 
but limited or ‘mediated’,20 a relationship of dependency on the United States was created, and a 
series of rigged elections allowed for no credible alternatives and, as a result, rebellion grew. When a 
reformist revolutionary government did manage to seize power in 1933 it barely existed a few months 
before a US-engineered coup led by Fulgencio Batista overthrew it.21  
                                           
12 Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v US) (1928) 2 RIAA, p.829. 
13 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), p.199. 
14 On modes of acquisition of title to territory see Robert Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory under 
International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963).   
15 Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, 10 December 1898. 
16 Louis A. Pérez, ‘The Pursuit of Pacification: Banditry and the United States’ Occupation of Cuba, 1889-
1902’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 18 (1986), pp.313-332. 
17 Richard Gott, Cuba: A New History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), p.98. 
18 Agreement of the Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, 23 February 
1903. 
19 Such an agreement would be seen as void under modern treaty law reflected in Article 52 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, as a treaty procured by coercion, but such a prohibition did not exist in 
1903 - Olivier Corten, ‘Article 52’ in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds), The Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxforrd University Press, 2011), p.1204. 
20 Marifeli Pérez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course and Legacy, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, 1999), pp.37-42. 
21 Jorge Ibarra, Prologue to Revolution (Boulder Col: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p.125. 
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The revolution that successfully overthrew General Batista’s dictatorship on 1 January 1959 is 
commonly represented as Cuba throwing off the yoke of United States’ crony capitalism only to 
submit to the oppressive yoke of Soviet communism. However, even after the failed attempt to base 
Soviet nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba in 1962,22 the Cuban revolutionary government led by Fidel 
Castro did  not adopt Soviet-style communism until the late 1960s/early 1970s, although it grew 
closer to the Soviet Union economically at an earlier stage, with Moscow buying most of Cuba’s 
sugar from 1963.23 It was in many ways a practical decision by the revolutionary government on the 
basis that the way to secure Cuban independence was to have an alliance with the Soviet Union, as the 
only country capable of withstanding US pressure.24 Certainly, the relationship with the Soviet Union 
was not a straightforward one, and the Cuban government’s ability to survive the end of the alliance is 
indicative of its independent will,25 as was many of its foreign  policies, for example, in Africa 
exemplified by its intervention on behalf of the Angolan government in 1975.26  
Cuban self-determination was part of a broader movement towards recognising a right of external 
self-determination for colonies and former colonies and dependencies across the globe. By 1970 the 
UN General Assembly’s Declaration of Friendly Relations reflected international consensus on the 
basic principles of international law including self-determination, which was said to be embodied in a 
government representing the whole people without distinction as to race, creed or colour,27 a standard 
against which the Cuban government measured well, certainly in comparison to many other states, 
including Western democracies. Certainly there was dissent and there were outflows of Cubans 
risking the hazardous journey across the Florida Straits, for example during the Mariel boatlift in 
1980, but that particular event was primarily caused by deep recession in Cuba,28 leading to thousands 
of mainly economic migrants heading to the US. Nonetheless, in the period from 1959-1979,  there 
were large outflows of Cubans dissatisfied with the ‘lurch towards socialism, let alone communism’,29 
some of whom would be seen in international law as refugees fleeing because of a well-founded fear 
of persecution ‘for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion’.30    
                                           
22 Philip Brenner, ‘Cuba and the Missile Crisis’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 22 (1990), pp.115-142. 
23 Gott, Cuba, p.235; Pérez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution, p.120. 
24 Yuri Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance 1959-1991 (Boulder Col: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p.17. 
25 Pavlov, Soviet-Cuban Alliance, p.263. 
26 Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Cuba, Africa, and the United States (Chapel Hill NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2002), p.9. 
27 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN Doc A/RES/2625 (1970). 
28  William M. LeoGrande and Peter Kornbluh, Back Channel to Cuba: The History of Negotiations Between 
Washington and Havana (Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), pp.214-18. 
29 Gott, Cuba, 212. 
30 Article 1A(2), Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951. 
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After the revolution of 1959, as well as the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961, the United States 
engaged in the subversion of Cuba (‘Operation Mongoose’), involving acts of intervention, other 
threats and uses of force, and assassinations. The United States refused to respect Cuban sovereignty 
and self-determination on the basis that the Cuban government represented a challenge to its policy of 
preventing any Communist regimes in its hemisphere, reflected in the United States’ role in 
overthrowing left-leaning governments in Guatemala in 1954 and the Dominican Republic in 1965.31 
However, behind this public hostility, negotiations between the two countries continued over the 
decades, with several concerted efforts to reach normalisation on the basis of sovereign equality most 
recently in the period 2013-2016. Within a week of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, which led 
to the capture and detention of over 1200 members of the exile brigade, Cuban President Osvaldo 
Dorticós indicated that his government wanted to ‘find a solution to the tension which exists between 
the two countries and which will lead to a form of peaceful co-existence, diplomatic and even friendly 
relations, if the government of the United States so desires’.32 The negotiations for the return of the 
prisoners were suspended during the missile crisis of 1962, but were successfully concluded with the 
exchange of prisoners for food and medicine.33 Thus, despite the desire of the United States 
government for regime change in Cuba, government-to-government channels remained open and 
continuous dialogue was maintained, reflecting a basic recognition of Cuban sovereignty by the 
United States.   
 
The Embargo and the Dispute about International Law 
The embargo was not simply part of an ideological struggle between the superpowers, but was part of 
a struggle over the development and understanding of fundamental principles of international law. 
President Eisenhower initially imposed measures, including revoking Cuba’s sugar quota, in October 
1960. As part of its effort to secure full independence, the Cuban government had introduced land 
reforms in 1959 and started to seize US and other Western-owned properties, businesses and assets 
early in 1960, with an offer of limited compensation that did not meet the Western international 
standard of being ‘prompt, adequate and effective’,34 terms which disguised the reality of a demand of 
damages for the full market value of the assets plus loss of future profits.35 Fidel Castro saw full-scale 
nationalisation of US property and businesses with an offer of minimal compensation at least in part 
                                           
31 In justifying armed intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, US President Johnson stated that the 
‘American nation cannot permit the establishment of another Communist dictatorship in the Western 
Hemisphere’; 52 Department of State Bulletin, 52 (1965), p.745. 
32 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, pp.47-8. 
33 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p.58. 
34 Gott, Cuba, p.180.  
35 As stated in an exchange between the US and Mexico in 1938, the so-called ‘Hull formula’, Hackworth, 
Digest of International Law, 3 (1940), p.655.  
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as a response to the cutting off of the sugar quota by the US, but there were more specific measures of 
Cuban expropriation of US-owned oil refineries before the US had responded by cutting the quota. 
However, these were undertaken by Cuba because the US had instructed US-owned oil refineries in 
Cuba not to refine Soviet oil.36  
It is difficult to impose a legal narrative of unlawful measure and lawful counter-measure on this 
murky world of ‘tit-for-tat’ actions and counter-actions that were first threatened, then introduced in 
phases, and then implemented in phases, especially when the embargo was clearly not centrally an  
instrument of law enforcement. The embargo was a significant element in a range of measures 
adopted by the US government aimed at regime change in Cuba.37 From the Cuban point of view its 
nationalisation programme reduced the ‘leverage of the United States over economic and political 
choices’, freeing Cuba from pre-revolutionary US dominance of its economy ‘including public 
utilities, energy industries, centers of finance, and large sugar estates’.38  
However, legally speaking it is certainly plausible to see the initial US sanctions, which were a 
forerunner to the full embargo imposed in 1962, as a justifiable form of counter-measure or non-
forcible reprisal taken in response to violations of international law by Cuba or, more simply, as a 
decision not to trade with an enemy or unfriendly state until a debt was settled in full. As stated by 
LeoGrande and Kornbluh: ‘viewed from Washington, the nationalization of US property in 1960 was 
the proximate cause for imposing the embargo, so it could not be lifted until the compensation issue 
was addressed’.39 The fact that other Western governments were eventually prepared to accept 
payments on behalf of their companies did not, of itself, undermine US rights under international law. 
The primitive nature of the international legal system is reflected in the fact that it still recognises as 
lawful non-forcible forms of self-help, although the reality was that the new Cuban government had 
no money to pay any significant amount of compensation given the previous regime’s appropriation 
of such.40  
                                           
36  Gott, Cuba, pp.183-4 
37 See, for example, Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 
(Mallory) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom):  proposing a sanctions 
regime that made ‘the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real 
wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government’; Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1958-1960, Cuba, Volume VI Document 499. See also Undersecretary of State George Ball describing 
the policy of ‘economic denial’ in detail on 23 April 1964: including: ‘to make plain to the people of Cuba and 
to elements of the power structure of the regime that the present regime cannot serve their interests’; George 
Ball, ‘Principles of Our Policy Toward Cuba’ Department of State Bulletin, 50 (1964), pp.738-44. 
38 Richard E. Feinberg, ‘Reconciling U.S. Property Claims in Cuba: Transforming Trauma into Opportunity’ 
(Brookings Institute, December 2015), p.2. 
39 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p.164. 
40 Julio César Mascarós, Historia de la Banca en Cuba, 1492-2000 (La Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 
2003). 
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Initially, President Eisenhower used the Export Control Act 1949 to authorize US acts of self-help in 
response to the events of the Cuban revolution in 1960.41 A piece of legislation adopted when the US 
entered the First World War, the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, was invoked to supplement the 
Foreign Assistance Act 1961, which empowered the President to impose an embargo, culminating in 
President Kennedy’s proclamation  in 1962. The US Cuban Asset Control Regulations, first adopted 
in 1963, and still in force, were adopted under the rubric of that piece of 1917 legislation: they froze 
Cuban assets, prohibited US nationals from conducting financial transactions with Cuba, and banned 
the import of goods of Cuban origin into the US.42 However, the fact that the embargo of Cuba finds a 
relatively clear basis in US law, and had an arguable basis in international law at least at the outset, 
does not signify that its continuation and entrenchment over time is lawful under international law. 
The subsequent clarification of some aspects of international law surrounding non-forcible measures 
by the Air Services Agreement Arbitration in 1978,43 and International Law Commission (ILC) in 
2001, suggests that unilateral countermeasures should be temporary, proportionate and should not be 
punitive,44 limitations that have not been observed in the case of the Cuban embargo. However, it 
might be asked whether these limitations are realistic in the face of a continuing and unremediated 
breach by Cuba, in the form of non-settlement of compensation claims?  Furthermore, justifications 
for the continuation of the embargo have broadened, especially after the Cold War, since when the US 
legal focus has been on the Cuban regime’s denial of human rights and democracy.   
Cuba’s legal position in the period of nationalisation, however, was that it was concerned with 
reclaiming sovereignty and securing self-determination in the sense of freedom to choose a nation’s 
economic, as well as political, future. In his speech to the UN General Assembly in 1960, Fidel Castro 
spoke of ‘the right of the underdeveloped countries to nationalize their natural resources and the 
investments of the monopolies in their respective countries without compensation’.45 It was in 1962 
that the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution asserting that states had permanent sovereignty 
over their natural resources and, therefore, had the right to expropriate foreign interests for a public 
purpose, subject to paying ‘appropriate’ compensation.46 Two years earlier, in 1960, the UN General 
Assembly had stated that all peoples had the right to self-determination in the shape of freedom from 
colonial or alien rule or subjugation.47 Both of these Resolutions read in the context of events in Cuba 
show that the Cuban struggle for political and economic self-determination was at the fulcrum of 
                                           
41 ‘Text of U.S. Announcement of Embargo’, New York Times, 20 October, 1960.  
42 Cuban Asset Control Regulations, 31 CFR 515, 8 July 1963.  
43 RIAA, 18 (1978), p.411. 
44 Articles 49-53 ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc A/56/49/(Vol. 
I)/Corr.4 (2001) 
45 UN Doc A/PV/864 (1960). 
46 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UN Doc A/RES/1803 (1962). 
47 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples, UN Doc A/RES/1514 
(1960). 
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changes in international law. It was no coincidence that Cuba rapidly became a leading light in the 
Non-Aligned Movement of developing countries that had freed themselves, at least de jure, from 
colonial rule, but who continued to push in the UN General Assembly for a new international 
economic order that would redress some of the imbalances between developed and developing 
countries.48  
Determining whether Cuba’s seizure of US-owned property and assets in the immediate post-
Revolution era was either a ‘wrongful’ act of expropriation or a ‘lawful’ act of self-determination 
would set in train a linear analysis of the legality of actions and reactions thereafter. However, 
international relations are not often so neatly packaged as to allow international law to operate in a 
structured way, whereby a violation of rights then leads to lawful acts of self-help which, somehow, 
remedy the original wrong. Such a one or two dimensional legal understanding of bilateral relations is 
inadequate, and the reality is more brutal.49 For instance, Cuba’s ‘wrongs’, at least from the 
perspective of the United States, were added to by its efforts to export revolution to overthrow US-
supported regimes in Latin America, and later in Africa. The details of each intervention varied but, in 
general terms, the United States appeared to be punishing Cuba by means of the embargo for Cuban 
breaches of community norms prohibiting unlawful force, while Cuba saw itself as providing support 
for peoples struggling to achieve another community norm - self-determination.50 Cuba could point to 
a series of UN General Assembly resolutions that encouraged ‘support’ for such peoples without 
specifying what that meant; while the United States could point to different paragraphs in the same 
resolutions that outlawed indirect aggression.51 In addition, Cuba tellingly argued that it did not seek 
to punish the United States for its support of repressive foreign regimes and armed groups,52 
highlighting a lack of reciprocal rights and duties that prevented the establishment of a normal 
bilateral relationship between the United States and Cuba.  
 
As has been stated, it is unlikely that the International Court of Justice will address the dispute, but 
not impossible as the Nicaragua v United States judgment of 1986 shows. Admittedly the refusal by 
the United States to accept the jurisdiction of the Court, as well as its rejection of the judgment itself, 
shows the limited value of the Court as a mechanism of dispute resolution. However, the Court did 
interpret and apply basic rules on the use of force and intervention and found that both countries had 
behaved unlawfully; Nicaragua by intervening in El Salvador and the US by counter-intervening in 
                                           
48 Declaration on the Establishment of the New International Economic Order, UN Doc A/RES/3201 (1974). 
49 Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Pragmatism, Security and International Law (Redwood CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2010), pp.62-4. 
50 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Case (Belgium v. Spain), (1970) ICJ Rep p.3. 
51 Articles 7, 3(g) Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, UN Doc A/RES/3314 (1974).  
52 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p.193. 
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Nicaragua.53 Bearing in mind this was a judgment concerning Cold War interventions, including 
Nicaragua’s intervention in El Salvador by supplying arms to the rebels in the country, arms that came 
from Cuba, a similar conclusion might be drawn in the Cuba-United States dispute; that both 
countries have behaved unlawfully.  However, a distinction must be drawn between those illegalities 
committed in the context of the bilateral dispute, namely Cuba’s unremediated expropriation of US-
owned property and various forcible and non-forcible US interventions in Cuba; from those violations 
that have been committed against other states or against their own citizens. In the latter instance, US 
claims that Cuba has violated civil and political rights of the Cuban people is countered, not only by 
Cuban claims that the embargo has violated the socio-economic rights of the Cuban people, but also 
by the fact that US policies have violated the human rights (for example, freedom of movement) of 
US citizens,54 as well as the glaring human rights abuse committed against detainees held in the US 
base at Guantánamo.55 While both states should bring their behaviour into line with applicable 
international norms; in the context of the bilateral dispute, normalisation should be predicated on 
addressing violations of those rights and duties applicable between the two states. 
 
Although it is possible to comprehend the embargo in the period 1962-1991 in the context of a 
momentous struggle between the superpowers it remains unlawful under international law as a 
violation of Cuba’s rights as a sovereign nation as well as the Cuban people’s socio-economic rights, 
but this does not strike from the record the original Cuban breach of international law. Up until 1991 
Soviet economic support made up for the lack of access to American markets and goods. From 
Presidential executive acts in the early 1960s responding to violations of US rights under international 
law, but primarily aimed at countering the threat from the Soviet Union, with the demise of the Soviet 
empire control of the embargo passed to Congress in the 1990s, first in the Torricelli Act in 1992 and 
then the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, making the embargo a matter of domestic US politics and law.56 
Rather than seizing the opportunity to end the dispute when Soviet support to Cuba was removed in 
1991 (meaning an immediate loss of 75-80% of Cuban trade),57 the United States chose to combine 
political expediency by handing control to Congress and the influential Cuban lobby, with a worrying 
decision to tighten the embargo to finish off a weakened Cuban government by increasing the punitive 
                                           
53 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, (Nicaragua v. US) (1986) 
ICJ Rep, p.14 at para 247. The Court found at para 245, without offering reasons, that a US trade embargo 
imposed on Nicaragua did not breach the customary international law principle of non-intervention. 
54 Ministry of Foreign Relations of Cuba, ‘Dialogue on Human Rights with the United States of America’, 14 
October, 2016. 
55 Johan Steyn, ‘Guantánamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole’ International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 53 
(2004), pp.1-15. 
56 Haney and Vanderbush, The Cuban Embargo, pp.99-107.  
57 Joy Gordon, ‘Economic Sanctions as Negative Development’ Journal of International Development, 28 
(2016), p.474. 
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nature of sanctions.58 Finishing off a weakened Cuban government would inevitably impact upon an 
even weaker Cuban population, a population who were not comforted by the stated purposes of the 
Helms-Burton Act to: ‘assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity’; ensure free 
and fair elections; protect the United States from Cuban terrorism;59 address the ‘theft’ of US-owned 
property; and respond to Cuba’s violation of human rights.60  
 
Under the Torricelli Act 1992 subsidiaries of US companies in third countries were prohibited from 
trading with Cuba and it banned third country ships that have visited a Cuban port from entering US 
territory within 180 days.61 Under the Helms-Burton Act 1996 penalties for breach of the embargo, 
for example importing any goods of Cuban origin, in whole or in part, were increased.62 In Title III 
the Act the granted US citizens a remedy in domestic courts against anyone ‘trafficking’ in property 
that was US-owned before its seizure by the Cuban government in the early 1960s. This was one of 
the so-called extra-territorial effects of Helms-Burton objected to by the UK and EU amongst others,63 
but its significance was far outweighed by the bringing together and tightening of all the previous 
elements of the embargo and its placement in legislation, legislation that remains in place to this day 
and will remain in operation, albeit in a reduced form since the rapprochement in December 2014, 
until Congress repeals it. Joy Gordon noted that ‘none of the changes introduced by President Obama 
[since December 2014]’ reversed ‘the congressional legislation that prohibits the direct or indirect sale 
of most Cuban products to US buyers and prohibits the sale of most goods to Cuban state 
enterprises’.64 However, there is some dispute regarding the President’s competence to license 
exemptions from the embargo, given that the underlying statutory basis of the embargo (the Trading 
with the Enemy Act and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations codified into the Helms-Burton Act) 
                                           
58 William M. LeoGrande, ‘Enemies Evermore: US Policy Towards Cuba After Helms-Burton’, Journal of 
Latin American Studies, 29 (1997), pp.211-221. 
59 Cuba was removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism by President Obama in 2015, having been 
on it since 1982 – Julie H. Davis, ‘US Removes Cuba from State-Sponsored Terrorism Lists’, New York Times, 
29 May 2015.  
60 Cuban Liberty and Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, Public Law 104-114, 12 March 1996 (Helms-Burton Act 
1996). 
61 Cuban Democracy Act, Public Law 102-484, 23 October 1992 (Torricelli Act 1992). 
62 Section 110(a), Helms-Burton Act 1996. 
63 UK Protection of Trading Interests Acts 1980 (applied by the Protection of Trading Interests Order, 1996, SI 
3171, to trade with Cuba); Council Regulation (EC) Regulation 2271/96 (1996). Both remain in force, though 
there has been little enforcement. FCO/UKTI guidance of 29 October 2015 is pertinent here: ‘The UK 
Protection of Trading Interests Act makes it illegal for UK-based companies to comply with extraterritorial 
legislation (like Helms-Burton) and there is provision for fines to be levied against offending companies and 
individuals. In parallel an EU Blocking Statute also makes it illegal to comply’.  
(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overseas-business-risk-cuba/overseas-business-risk-cuba 
accessed 12 November 2017). 
64 Joy Gordon, ‘El Bloqueo: The Cuban Embargo Continues’, (http://harpers.org/archive/2016/07/el-bloqueo 
accessed 12 November 2017).   
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do not appear to limit the President’s licensing authority.65 When President Obama licensed sales to 
Cuban state enterprises in January 2016, if those sales would ‘meet the needs of the Cuban people’,66 
this potentially had vast scope. However, given that a broad licensing approach would substantially 
impair the application of the Helms-Burton Act, there has to be question marks against the President’s 
competence to do so. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, President Trump’s policy changes 
towards Cuba announced on 16 June 2017 are likely to lead towards a limited re-tightening of the 
embargo, leaving the debate about the extent of licencing exceptions unresolved.  
 
Despite President Obama’s changes to the embargo fines were still imposed on US and third-country 
companies by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).  Two of many examples given by the 
Cuban government include: a fine of $272,000 imposed by OFAC in 2015 on a US maritime 
insurance company (Navigators Insurance Company) for making a claim payment in which a Cuban 
national had an interest; and a fine of $1.7 billion imposed in 2015 on the German Bank 
Commerzbank for its operations with Cuban banks.67 The US Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) made it clear in November 2017 that: ‘The Cuba embargo remains in place. Most 
transactions between the United States, or persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, and Cuba continue to 
be prohibited, and OFAC continues to enforce the prohibitions of the CACR’. 68 The regulatory 
changes made under President Obama, effective in 2015-16 were targeted to further engage and 
empower the Cuban people by facilitating authorized travel to Cuba by persons subject to US 
jurisdiction; certain authorized commerce and financial transactions; and the flow of information to, 
from, and within Cuba. 
 
Following President Trump’s policy changes announced on 16 June 2017, there was some tightening 
of the embargo once regulations were amended in November 2017,69 but the changes announced were 
                                           
65 Robert Muse, ‘Can Obama Lift the Embargo on Cuba Without Congress in Effort to Normalize U.S.-Cuba 
Relations?, Democracy Now, 18 December 2014 
(https://www.democracynow.org/2014/12/18/can_obama_lift_the_embargo_on, accessed 12 November 2017). 
66 US Department of the Treasury, ‘Treasury and Commerce Announce Further Amendments to the Cuba 
Sanctions Regulations’, 26 January 2016 ( https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/jl0328.aspx accessed 12 November 2017). 
67 Report of UN Secretary General UN Doc A/71/91 (2016) 33-35. Marija Dordeska, ‘OFAC’s Settlement with 
Commerzbank AG: Coerced Voluntary Settlements of the Competitively Disadvantaged’, EJIL Talk (Blog of 
the European Journal of International Law), 20 March 2015; in which it is explained that OFAC relies on 
voluntary settlement by foreign companies and banks who would rather pay the fine than challenge it and lose 
access to the US economy and financial system (https://www.ejiltalk.org/ofacs-settlement-with-commerzbank-
ag-coerced-voluntary-settlements-of-the-competitively-disadvantaged/, accessed 12 November 2017). 
68 US Department of the Treasury, Frequently Asked Questions Related to Cuba’, 
(https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_faqs_new.pdf accessed 12 
November 2017). 
69 On 8 September 2017 President Trump extended the embargo of Cuba for a further year under the Trading 
with the Enemy Act – Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury 
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/09/08/presidential-memorandum-secretary-state-and-
secretary-treasury-0, accessed 12 November 2017).   
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less than anticipated, and amounted to a revision rather than a reversal.70 President Obama had used 
his executive powers, after the agreement towards normalisation was announced in December 2014, 
to ensure that exceptions in the embargo were extended so as to become difficult to reverse. Indeed, it 
is possible that the changes they produced in Cuba by increasing the presence of US companies, 
goods and citizens, will make the embargo difficult to sustain politically and economically in the long 
run.71  
 
 
The Post-Cold War Embargo as Deliberate Harm 
 
Thus far international law has been depicted as part of the dispute due in part to the problem of its 
indeterminacy. However, there are aspects of the dispute between Cuba and the United States that 
demonstrate clear breaches of fundamental legal rules. That is not to say that the governments do not 
dispute them, but that the evidence of breach is compelling and the actions leading to those breaches 
are indefensible in law. This is particularly so in the case of the tightening of the embargo by the 
United States in the 1990s, which had dramatic effects on the health of the Cuban population. The 
government of the United States took cruel advantage of the removal of Soviet support to try and 
force regime change by a starving population. The effect on life expectancy, the reduction in weight 
of the average Cuban, the impact on new born babies are all detailed in a report by the independent 
and respected American Association for World Health (AAWH) in 1997.72 The period of 5-10 years 
after the demise of the Soviet Union, when the Cuban population was especially vulnerable, was when 
the US legislature chose to continue, indeed intensify, its sanctions against Cuba. That demonstrates 
sufficient intent to cause deliberate harm and damage to Cuba and to its people, over and beyond the 
US exercising its rights to choose trade partners.  
 
One of the unaddressed aspects of when a state can be held legally responsible for internationally 
wrongful acts is causation – did the wrongful act (in this case the continuation and tightening of the 
                                           
70 Michael Putney, ‘Trump’s Cuba Policy Looks a Lot Like President Obama’s’, Miami Herald, 20 June 2017. 
The amended regulations restricted financial transactions with those individuals and entities on the ‘Cuba 
Restricted List’; restrict travel freedoms introduced by President Obama – US Department of Treasury, FAQs, 8 
November 2017, question 3. 
71 The Cuban government claims that ‘there are only four aspects of the embargo that are beyond the reach of 
Presidential decisions: ‘1. The rule that prohibits US subsidiaries in third countries trading with Cuba (Torricelli 
Act). 2. The ban on transactions with United States properties that were nationalized in Cuba (Helms-Burton 
Act); 3. The law that prevents United States citizens from visiting Cuba as tourists (Trade Sanctions Reform and 
Enhancement Act of 2000). 4. The ban on granting financing for the sale of United States agricultural products 
to Cuba (Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000)’, UN Secretary General Report, UN 
Doc A/71/91 (2016), p.32. 
72 AAWH, Denial of Food and Medicine: The Impact of the US Embargo on Health and Nutrition in Cuba, 
March1997 
(http://www.medicc.org/resources/documents/embargo/The%20impact%20of%20the%20U.S.%20Embargo%20
on%20Health%20&%20Nutrition%20in%20Cuba.pdf accessed 12 November 2017). 
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embargo in 1992) cause the damage to the Cuban people?73 The decision to continue the embargo was 
clearly an act of state by the United States, as it was a decision by its legislative body, but did it cause 
the losses suffered by the Cuban population? The evidence drawn from bodies like the AAWH, as 
well as reports from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,74 all clearly point to 
violations of the socio-economic rights of thousands of individuals in Cuba as a result of the impact of 
United States’ legislation tightening the embargo in the 1990s75 – this was deliberate damage inflicted 
on Cuba, more specifically its people, and was not sufficiently mitigated by any of humanitarian 
exceptions built into the embargo.76  
 
Furthermore, this squeeze could not be justified by the on-going violations of civil and political rights 
by the Cuban government as claimed in the Helms-Burton Act. Those violations have been 
condemned by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; for instance in the so-called Black 
Spring clampdown on dissent of 2003.77 However, the continuing imposition of punitive measures by 
the United States that impact upon the whole of the population, as opposed to targeted measures that 
might have been directed at the Cuban regime, are not justified under international law, indeed they 
constitute a form of collective punishment of the Cuban government and the Cuban people. 
Furthermore, such measures, which go beyond temporary counter-measures, should be imposed 
multilaterally, through the Organisation of American States (OAS) or the UN, and not unilaterally on 
the basis of one state’s understanding of international law. The OAS did exclude Cuba in 1962 and 
then imposed certain non-forcible measures against it in 1964 under Articles 6 and 8 of the Rio 
Treaty,78 but these were repealed in 1975.79 In 2009 the OAS rescinded its exclusion of Cuba.80  
 
There have been claims that breaches of fundamental norms of international law are violations of 
obligations owed to the whole international community and, therefore, are enforceable by any state or 
states.81 However, the International Law Commission did not accept this when codifying the law on 
                                           
73 Brigitte Stern, ‘The Elements of an Internationally Wrongful Act’ in James Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon 
Olleson (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p.193. 
74 For example, Annual Report, 2012, para.17 (http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2012/TOC.asp accessed 
12 November 2017). See also Report to the UN Human Rights Council, The Situation of Human Rights in Cuba, 
26 January 2007, para. 7.   
75 Gordon, ‘Economic Sanctions’, p.474. 
76 For example, the prohibition of ships trading with Cuba from docking in the US meant that mixed cargoes 
containing medical supplies, for instance, would not be exported to Cuba – see Cuban government’s statement 
in UN Secretary General’s Report, UN Doc A/71/91 (2016). 
77 For example, Oscar Elías Biscet et al v Cuba, Report No. 67/06, Case 12.476, 21 October 2006. 
78 OAS Doc OEA/Ser C/II.9, Doc 48, Rev 2 (1964). 
79 OAS Doc OEA/Ser F/II. Doc 9/75 Rev 2 (1975). 
80 On 3 June 2009, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Americas adopted resolution AG/Res 2438 (XXXIX-
O/09), which resolved that the 1962 exclusion of Cuba from participation from the OAS ceased to have effect. 
The 2009 resolution stated that the participation of Cuba will be the result of a process of dialogue initiated at 
the request of the government of Cuba, and will be in accordance with the practice, purposes and principles of 
the OAS. Cuba welcomed this development but has not yet re-joined the organisation. 
81 Elena Katselli Prouaki, The Problem of Enforcement in International Law (London: Routledge, 2010), p.285. 
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responses to violations of international law, and limited and disputed state practice revolves around 
responses to atrocities and core crimes, such as the crime of genocide, not to the type of human rights 
violations as have occurred in Cuba.82 Thus the Cuban government’s human rights record cannot 
justify the continuing imposition of the embargo and in particular the tightening of it that occurred in 
the 1990s in circumstances where the United States intended it to have devastating consequences. 
 
Although the Cuban government has claimed in the past that the impact of embargo amounted to the 
crime of genocide,83 it would be necessary to prove that the US government, or its leaders, had the 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Cuban people.84 In its more recent statements the Cuban 
government has justifiably pointed to violation of the rights to health and food, education and culture, 
and more broadly the right to development, attributable to the embargo.85 Although these are socio-
economic rights, and neither the US or Cuba is a party to the appropriate human rights treaties 
(principally the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights),86 the rights to food, 
medicine and education are seen as core customary rights that can apply extraterritorially irrespective 
of treaty obligation.87 Thus, while it would be very difficult to prove a genocidal intent to destroy the 
Cuban people on the part of the United States, there is little doubt that the embargo caused serious 
human rights violations in Cuba for which the United States is responsible.   
 
 
International Law and Dispute Settlement 
 
It is thus possible to isolate certain aspects of the embargo and analyse them as clear violations of 
international laws; in these instance international law can provide relatively definite and precise 
determinations of legal responsibility. Outside of those determinations, the bilateral dispute between 
the United States and Cuba has involved escalating measures and countermeasures by both states: 
Cuba expropriated US-owned property in the first years after the revolution in 1959, the United States 
responded by an embargo and other forms of intervention although there are question marks over who 
acted first; Cuba intervened in Latin America and Africa, the United States viewed this as a threat to 
its interests as well as violating peremptory norms and hardened the embargo; despite the end of the 
Socialist Bloc in 1991 the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro refused to fall and was criticised for 
continuing to violate basic civil and political rights, so the United States responded further by 
                                           
82 James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.302. 
83 UN Doc A/64/PV.27 ((2009), p.29 Mr Rodriguez Padrila (Cuba). 
84 Article 1 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948. 
85 UN Secretary General’s Report UN Doc A/71/91 (2016), pp. 36-43. 
86 Cuba signed the Covenant in 2008 but has not ratified it. The US signed in 1977 but has not ratified the 
Covenant. Only ratification will oblige state to protect all the rights contained in the Covenant. 
87 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, ‘The Nature of States Parties 
Obligations: Article 2(1) of the Covenant’, UN Doc E/1991/23, para 10 (1991). 
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tightening the embargo and giving it extraterritorial effects and, by so doing, did deliberate harm to 
the Cuban population. International law not only failed to control this escalation but, in some ways, 
facilitated it by providing the legal basis for each side’s justifications and, furthermore, by not clearly 
prohibiting economic coercion as it has done military coercion.88 So how can international law 
provide a solution? 
 
A suggested answer is that international law can provide a route to the establishment of full, stable 
and normal inter-state relations based on mutual respect for each state’s sovereignty and self-
determination. This is one of the functions of the laws on state responsibility – the so-called secondary 
rules of international law that determine liability for breaches of the primary rules (such as those 
prohibiting aggression, and those protecting the right to self-determination and to basic socio-
economic and well as civil and political rights), so that when wrongful acts have been committed by 
states their legal responsibility should be established and addressed by a variety of means, some 
judicial but mostly diplomatic and non-judicial.  
 
Such methods of dispute settlement may include mechanisms for attributing individual criminal 
responsibility, for example, as found in the trial of the two Libyan agents suspected of the Lockerbie 
bombing of 1988, which was part of a restoration in 2003 of normal relations between the United 
States and the United Kingdom on one side and the Libyan government on the other. In the US-Cuba 
dispute, there are criminal cases to be answered: for instance in relation to the destruction of the 
Cuban Airlines plane in 1976 with the loss of 73 lives; and the shooting down of the two ‘Brothers to 
the Rescue’ planes in 1996 by the Cuban airforce (the immediate reason for the adoption of the 
Helms-Burton Act). That will probably be a necessary part of the restorative process between the two 
countries, but given the basic inter-state nature of the dispute, full restoration will depend upon 
agreeing a process of peaceful settlement that started with the establishment of diplomatic relations, as 
was announced in December 2014,89 but should then include fact finding and conciliation, as well as 
agreement on mechanisms for settlement of the US claims to compensation for expropriation of US-
owned properties and businesses by the Cuban government in the early years of the revolution,90 and 
                                           
88 While Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the ‘threat or use of force’ in international relations, this is 
understood as only covering military force. Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p.362. But see Jordan Paust and Albert P. Blaustein, ‘The Arab Oil 
Weapon – a Threat to International Peace’, American Journal of International Law, 68 (1974), p.417. 
89 The Cuban embassy was reopened in Washington in July 2015, the first time since 1961 – P. Lewis, ‘Cuban 
embassy opens in Washington but important issues remain unresolved’, The Guardian, 20 July 2015. The US 
embassy in Havana was official re-opened in August 2015 – T. McCarthy, ‘US embassy in Cuba formally 
reopens: ‘A day for pushing aside old barriers’, The Guardian, 14 August 2015. But see J. Borger, ‘US warns 
Americans to avoid Cuba and slashes embassy staff after sonic attacks’, The Guardian, 29 September 2017.   
90 Creighton University ‘Report on the Resolution of Outstanding Property Claims Between Cuba and the 
United States (Creighton University Press, 2007) 3-5. See more recently Feinberg, ‘Reconciling U.S. Property 
Claims in Cuba’, (2015). Both reports make it clear that under international law Cuba’s obligation to 
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Cuban claims for human rights damage caused by the US embargo and for individual acts of sabotage. 
This could take the form of tribunal to receive individual claims by US citizens and Cuban citizens 
who have suffered loss as a result of the wrongful acts of both states, on the lines of the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal established in 1981, forged in the context of a very hostile relationship to adjudicate 
and compensate claims by US businesses that had been expropriated or had suffered loss during the 
Iranian revolution.91 Alternatively, it might include an inter-state agreement on a joint compensation 
fund to be handled by a non-judicial joint claims commission set up by the respective governments. 
Of course there have to be bilateral negotiations and compromise about which claims are in principle 
receivable and the parameters of compensation.92 
  
The restoration of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba, achieved by President 
Obama and continued under President Trump, is only the first step that will facilitate a ‘deliberative 
dialogue’ towards further normalising their wider bilateral relations.93 The dialogue will feature 
international law as a central part of the language of diplomacy. Indeed, the history of the Cuba-US 
dispute shows that this dialogue has continued behind the scenes even during the Cold War period. 
For example, during the Presidency of Jimmy Carter in 1978, quiet diplomacy came close to 
rapprochement, with Cuban diplomats indicating an acceptance of the principle of compensation for 
US citizens whose property had been expropriated, while the US envoy raised the issue of whether the 
Cuban government expected compensation for the costs of the embargo and the acts of sabotage in the 
1960s.94 However, the opportunity to make further progress was lost because of continuing 
disagreement about Cuba’s Africa policy. Cuba insisted that its interventions in Angola and Ethiopia 
were at the invitation of the governments of those countries to help defend against external aggression 
and, further, were within ‘the purview of Cuban sovereignty’ and, therefore, ‘should have no bearing 
on bilateral relations’.95 Nevertheless, Cuba’s African policy blocked the path towards normalisation 
based on a common legal understanding. Although such ‘back channel’ dialogue was important to 
maintain as it prevented an escalation towards armed conflict, it can only come to fruition in the sense 
of facilitating a settlement of the dispute when the political context allows for  inter-subjective 
understanding of the applicable law by the disputants acting as an interpretive community.96  
 
                                                                                                                                   
compensate only related to properties and businesses that were owned by US nationals at the time of 
expropriation, and not to properties of Cuban citizens who subsequently received US citizenship. 
91 David Muller, ‘The Iran-US Claims Tribunal’, in Crawford, Pellet and Olleson (eds), Law of International 
Responsibility,  p.843   
92 Feinberg, ‘Reconciling U.S. Property Claims in Cuba’, p.24. 
93 Steven Wheatley, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
p.138. 
94 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p.188. 
95 LeoGrande and Kornbluh, Back Channel, p.191-93. 
96 Ian Johnstone, ‘The Plea of “Necessity” in International Law Discourse: Humanitarian Intervention and 
Counter-Terrorism’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 43 (2005), p.381. 
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A constructivist approach to international law views norms as ‘reasons for action not causes of action’. 
Moreover, such norms are construed by different actors from their subjective viewpoints so that norms 
have an inter-subjective nature and are employed by actors, including states, to ‘coordinate outcomes’.97 
Constructivism explains this inter-subjectivity in terms of how ‘actors behave towards the world around 
them in ways that are shaped by ideas that they hold about the world, and that these ideas are generated 
by past interactions’ and, furthermore, these ideas can change over time.98 Social interactions between 
states shape the ideas of each actor, including the way states respond to the rules of international law.99 
Constructivism explains the fluidity of the law applicable to states and, in this respect, contrasts with the 
orthodox positivist depiction of law as objective and certain. However, the modern legal positivist 
approach of H.L.A. Hart, which sees law as a ‘social rule’, depicts laws as having core certainty, but 
admits of a degree of uncertainty inherent in the very nature of language, where interpretation is 
contested.100 
 
In effect, in a constructivist conception of law, international law operates as the common language for 
diplomacy and not as a system of readily applicable rules. This allows the parties to achieve 
understanding upon which a peaceful solution can be built. When the political relationship governing 
two states comes to an end international law operates to fill in the space vacated by politics, but it 
does not do so by providing a ready solution or answer. International law must be discussed, 
interpreted, agreed upon in formal or informal terms and, finally, implemented. If common ground 
has been successfully captured in that agreement subsequent political relations can be framed by 
international law and encapsulated in that agreement. It may take several further years of negotiation 
and diplomacy, with no guarantee of success, to attempt to deal with past wrongs and ensure that 
future relations are based on mutual respect for sovereignty and self-determination. Advances in the 
application of international law to seemingly intractable disputes depend upon major changes in 
political context that serve to remove the obstacles to establishing bilateral relations based on mutual 
respect.101 The United States (and Cuba) missed the opportunity to turn to international law at the end 
of the Cold War, while the stepping down of Fidel Castro from power in 2008 and his death on 25 
November 2016, the changing Latin American political landscape, and the fact that President Obama 
was in his last term, have all led to the recent shift. However, the final stage will probably require a 
more momentous shift in political context.  
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University Press, 2011), p.23. See further Alexander Wendt, ‘Constructing International Politics’, International 
Security, 20 (1995), pp.71-81. 
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100 Herbert L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp.126-29. 
101 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Place of Law in Collective Security’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 17 
(2006), p.476. 
20 
 
The repeal of the Helms-Burton Act may only occur when politics within the United States are in 
alignment, but may also require the withdrawal from Cuban government of Raúl Castro since the Act 
explicitly states that the United States will not fully accept a Cuban government with either Castro 
brother in it.102 Until then full respect for international law in relations between the two countries may 
remain unfulfilled. Nonetheless, international law does not disappear since both parties constantly 
frame their dispute by reference to it, but it will not be implemented until both parties can agree on 
common ground within those disputed principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, self-determination 
and human rights. LeoGrande and Kornbluh point to one of the key lessons to be distilled from years 
of back channel dialogue between the two governments, namely that ‘Cuba wants to be treated as an 
equal, with respect for its national sovereignty’.103 International law provides a level playing field 
between disputants by its continued foundation on sovereign equality, but it requires the United States 
to agree to join Cuba on this field. 
 
The possibilities of this process being embarked upon were demonstrated by the content of the 
simultaneous announcements made by Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro on 17 December 
2014, after they had both thanked Pope Francis for ‘helping to broker a historic deal to begin 
normalising relations between the United States and Cuba, after 18 months of secret talks over 
prisoner releases brought a sudden end to decades of Cold War hostility’.104 Under the agreement full 
diplomatic relations were to be re-established for the first time since January 1961. President Obama 
agreed to use his executive powers to relax aspects of the embargo. 
 
President Raúl Castro’s speech of 17 December 2014 was peppered with international legal 
principles, and with offers to discuss differences between the governments within the parameters of 
those principles. President Castro expressed his ‘willingness to hold a respectful dialogue with the 
United States on the basis of sovereign equality, in order to deal reciprocally with a wide variety of 
topics without detriment to the national independence and self-determination of our people’. He 
recalled the struggle of the Cuban people to achieve that independence and self-determination that 
was begun in the fight for independence from Spain in 1868 that culminated in the coming to power 
of the revolution of 1959. The principles of the revolution had been defended in the face of ‘serious 
dangers, aggressions, adversities and sacrifices’. President Castro expressed his commitment to ‘the 
task of updating our economic model in order to build a prosperous and sustainable Socialism’. The 
Cuban leader remarked that the dialogue between the two sovereign governments at the ‘highest 
level’ had resulted in ‘headway’ being made ‘in the solution of some topics of mutual interest for both 
nations’. Although the governments had ‘agreed to renew diplomatic relations’; the ‘heart of the 
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matter’ had not been solved as the ‘economic, commercial, and financial blockade, which causes 
enormous human and economic damages’ to Cuba continued. However, President Castro noted that 
‘though the blockade has been codified into law, the President of the United States has the executive 
authority to modify its implementation’. He finished his speech by appealing to principles of peaceful 
settlement, non-intervention and peaceful co-existence.105 
 
The content of President Obama’s speech shows that he viewed steps towards normalisation of 
relations between the two governments as a change in method, away from isolating Cuba by sanctions 
towards engaging with it by peaceful means, but to the same ends as before, namely of ‘promoting the 
emergence of a democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba’. The President argued that by easing the 
effect of extremely coercive sanctions, the allegedly repressive nature of the Cuban regime should 
become clearer and, with no external enemy to be blamed for their deprivations, the Cuban people 
should be more demonstrative in their demands for democratic reform and for a government that 
respects their civil and political rights. In making this statement, President Obama did not accept the 
illegality of the embargo, rather its ineffectiveness in promoting democratic change, as well as the 
failure by the United States to gain multilateral support for it, leading to its isolation on this matter.106 
In fact one of the on-going measures undertaken by the United States has been the allocation of funds 
to promote democracy in Cuba;107  something which the Cuban government views as illegal funding 
of subversion in violation of the prohibition on interference in its domestic affairs.108   
Despite the many obstacles that remain, President Obama portrayed the move towards normalisation 
of relations with Cuba as part of a wider process of reconciliation regionally and internationally; one 
that will bring Cuba into the formal processes of international exchange, influence and scrutiny, 
nudging it towards openness and democracy. However, to keep it engaged any external pressure for 
reform must enable Cuba to retain that hard fought for sovereignty and independence from foreign 
domination. President Obama seemed to recognise this balance between external promotion of 
democracy and respect for the right of the Cuban people to choose the future direction of their 
country: ‘the promotion of democracy supports universal human rights by empowering civil society 
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and a person’s right to speak freely, peacefully assemble, and associate, and by supporting the ability 
of people to freely determine their future’. United States’ ‘efforts are aimed at promoting the 
independence of the Cuban people so they do not need to rely on the Cuban state’, but importantly, 
‘ultimately, it will be the Cuban people who drive economic and political reforms’.109  
By framing their agreement by reference to fundamental principles of international law, both leaders 
offered the prospect of being able to normalise relations in the common ground that can be found if 
the processes of peaceful settlement, that have been initiated by the restoration of diplomatic relations, 
are given a chance to work.  
 
A Hardening of Pragmatism 
The US government’s handling of United States-Cuba relations has varied between US Presidents,110 
although the embargo has persisted. Most if not all Presidents have adopted a pragmatic position, 
whereby the power of the US prevailed over the principles of international law when it was faced with 
arguments that it had acted unlawfully, but there was no such inversion when it was alleged that Cuba 
behaved unlawfully. The latest Administration behaves in a way that indicates a turn to a very strong 
version of pragmatism, captured by the New York Times in its headline after the election – ‘Business 
or Politics? What Trump Means for Cuba’.111 Unfortunately, there does not appear to be much room 
for law in that equation. However, pragmatic reasoning does not ignore law. Pragmatic reasoning 
includes international law in its calculations, but inherently only accepts rules that ‘reflect underlying 
geopolitical realities’, so that states will judge for themselves what is required to defend their essential 
interests.112 Pragmatism and constructivism do not diverge greatly in their understanding of the 
subjectivity of norms, though they disagree as to their influence on state behaviour. ‘Pragmatism 
focuses on what experience tells us will work, not on what doctrine, dogma, or morality tells us must 
work’. For the pragmatist the ‘question is always, what are the probable costs and benefits – the long- 
and short-term consequences – of the proposed action?’113  
President-elect Trump hardened his stance on Cuba throughout the 2016 Presidential election 
campaign promising to undo the concession made by President Obama under executive orders until 
the Castro regime meets US demands. However, US businesses that exploited the concessions since 
2014 have legitimate claims for compensation if these are retrospectively deemed unlawful under US 
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law. The policy changes announced by President Trump on 16 June 2017 seek to protect existing 
commercial arrangements, while prohibiting future transactions between US businesses and the 
Cuban military (which is deeply embedded in the Cuban economy) under new regulations adopted in 
November 2017.114 This indicates a significant tightening of the embargo, but much will depend upon 
the way the regulations are understood and enforced. The other restriction announced by President 
Trump, involving the closing off of individual travel by US citizens that was clearly being exploited 
for the purposes of tourism, will also have an impact on the Cuban economy but, overall, the policy 
changes seem limited and have not appeared to undermine broader cooperation.115 The indication that 
President Trump will continue the previous policy of suspending the application of Title III of the 
Helms Burton Act 1996,116 also demonstrates that pragmatic reasoning has not precluded the 
possibility that the process of normalisation will continue.    
 
Conclusion 
In a UN report of 2016 published before the US Presidential election, the Cuban government stated 
that many aspects of the embargo not only remained US law but were being enforced by US 
authorities, with continuing extraterritorial effects.117 In justification, the US continues to point to 
violations of human rights by the Cuban government,118 and persists in its claims to compensation for 
expropriations of US-owned property and businesses in the 1960s. Thus, the dispute remains a long 
way from resolution. 
To fully unblock the process of normalisation, both sides need to recognise their own responsibility 
for violations of international law and to cease those violations. Both states then need to move from 
disputes about which primary rules of international law have been breached in the context of the 
bilateral dispute between the two countries, to the secondary level of responsibility. These rules have 
the potential unlock the means and methods dispute settlement such as fact finding, tribunals and 
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other remedial mechanisms. There have been some encouraging signs with the establishment in 2015 
of a US-Cuba Bilateral Commission established to advance the normalisation process between the US 
and Cuba, and a US-Cuba Dialogue on Claims to exchange details on outstanding claims,119 but the 
question remains whether these initiatives will continue under President Trump.  
In such negotiations international legal discourse forms a pivotal part of the exchanges given that 
claims, remedies and compensation have to derive from legal obligations and agreed understandings 
of responsibility for violating laws that bind both states. Moreover, remedies themselves are shaped 
by legal doctrine and norms, but require dialogue and compromise to be realised.120 The recent turn to 
pragmatism under President Trump might operate against an equitable understanding of compensation 
that recognises that both sides have legitimate claims, but would instead use the power imbalance to 
assert the primacy of the US position. More broadly, it remains to be seen whether President Trump 
will respect the very basic obligation that underpins the international legal order, namely, to settle 
disputes peacefully on the basis of international law and justice.121 Only a peaceful settlement, in 
which both parties turn to compliance with international law by settling claims and ending the 
embargo as part of a mutual recognition of sovereignty and of all the international rights and duties 
that entails, will produce a stable and beneficial bilateral relationship between Cuba and the United 
States – one that has a chance of lasting as long as the embargo itself.     
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